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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-FEDERAL
REQUIREMENT THAT CATTLE PRODUCERS FUND STATUTORILY
CREATED CATTLEMEN'S BOARD AND BEEF PROMOTION
OPERATING COMMITTEE DOES NOT VIOLATE FREE
SPEECH OR ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS
United States v. Frame (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of large federal budget deficits in the 1980s has forced
Congress to pursue traditional governmental ends through means that
do not exacerbate the budget problem. One example is the Beef Re-
search and Information Act' (the Act) which requires cattle producers to
pay one dollar to a Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board on
each head of cattle sold in the United States.2 The Act allows the gov-
ernment to achieve its goal of maintaining and strengthening markets
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2911 (1988).
2. See id. § 2904(8)(A); 7 C.F.R. § 1260.311(a) (1989). Individuals who
purchase cattle from a cattle producer are designated "collecting person[s]"
under the Act and are required to collect the one dollar per-head assessment
from the producer and remit the assessment to the Cattlemen's Board. Id. Sec-
tion 2904(8)(A) sets forth the collection procedure:
(A) the [beef promotion and research] order shall provide that each
person making payment to a producer for cattle purchased from the
producer shall, in the manner prescribed by the order, collect an as-
sessment and remit the assessment to the Board. The Board shall use
qualified State beef councils to collect such assessments.
7 U.S.C. § 2904(8)(A) (1988). In addition, producers are charged a two percent
fine each month beginning with the day following the date such assessments
were due. 7 C.F.R. § 1260.175 (1989). For a detailed discussion of the statutory
scheme of the Beef Research and Information Act, see infra notes 17-20 and
accompanying text.
By assessing a compulsory fee, this Act differed significantly from a similar
Beef Research and Information Act passed in 1976 which provided for
mandatory refunds. Act of May 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-294, 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (90 Stat.) 535. The 1976 Act did not become effective,
however, because it failed, as required by its terms, to gain two thirds approval
among cattle producers in a referendum taken pursuant to the 1976 Act. L.
GLASER, PROVISIONS OF THE FOOD SECURrrv ACT OF 1985 74 (1986). The 1976
Act was amended in 1978 to require only majority approval before becoming
effective. Act of August 4, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-334, § 302, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 433. In the referendum held pursuant to the
1978 amendment, however, only 34% of producers voted favorably. GLASER,
supra, at 75. In 1985, Congress enacted another Beef Information and Research
Act, and again required that, for the 1985 Act to remain effective, it must receive
majority approval from cattle producers in a referendum taken pursuant to the
1985 Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2906(a) (1988). In the referendum held on May 10, 1988,
77% of the eligible cattle producers voted favorably, so that the 1985 Act re-
mained effective. United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1124 (3d Cir. 1989).
(762)
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for beef produced in the United States,3 without having to expend dol-
lars from general revenue funds. Consequently, the deficit is not in-
creased. 4 Prior Supreme Court cases, however, have held that the right
to freedom of speech and association secured by the first amendment is
implicated when the government forces a citizen to fund organizations
that espouse views which that citizen rejects. 5 In United States v. Frame,6
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a cattle
producer's contention that the Act violated his first amendment rights
by forcing him to associate with entities that espoused views with which
3. 7 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(4) (1988). The statute contains an explicit statement
of Congressional findings and declaration of policy: "Congress finds that the
maintenance and expansion of existing markets for beef and beef products are
vital to the welfare of beef producers and those concerned with marketing, us-
ing, and producing beef products, as well as to the general economy of the Na-
tion." Id.
Congress also made several other findings: that beef and beef products are
a valuable part of human diet; that the production of beef and beef products
plays a significant role in the nation's economy; and that beef and beef products
should be readily available and marketed efficiently to ensure that the people of
the United States receive adequate nourishment. Id. § 2901(a)(1)-(3).
To achieve these goals, the Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to is-
sue a Beef Promotion and Research Order. Id. § 2903(b). The Act also deline-
ated the fundamental terms of the order. Id. § 2904. The Secretary's order
implementing the Act, which became effective on July 18, 1986, is codified at 7
C.F.R. §§ 1260.101-.316 (1989).
4. See United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1135 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he
Beef Research and Information Act was . . . incorporated into the larger Food
Security Act of 1985 ... which aimed to protect the farm and livestock industry
'in the face of the national deficit, which requires the tightest possible constraint
on federal spending.'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 2(1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1135)). Con-
gress has enacted programs similar to the Beef Promotion Act for the following
agricultural products: cotton (7 U.S.C. §§ 2101-18 (1988)); potatoes (7 U.S.C.§§ 2611-27 (1988)); eggs (7 U.S.C. §§ 2701-18 (1988)); dairy products (7 U.S.C.§§ 4501-19 (1988)); honey (7 U.S.C. §§ 4601-12 (1988)); pork (7 U.S.C.
§§ 4801-19 (1988)); and watermelon (7 U.S.C. §§ 4901-16 (1988)). Thus, the
constitutionality of these Acts was also called into question by this case.
5. The Supreme Court has held that mandatory assessments implicate free
speech and associational rights in two separate contexts: mandatory union dues
and mandatory bar association dues. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820(1961) (mandatory bar association dues used to fund apolitical activities held
constitutional); Railway Employee's Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)(mandatory union dues infringe free speech and association rights but are con-
stitutional). For a discussion of the Court's decisions considering mandatory
funding of unions and bar associations, see infra notes 67-79 and accompanying
text.
In addition, several circuit courts have held that requiring students in public
universities to fund organizations, such as school newspapers, that espouse
views rejected by dissenting students, implicates free speech and associational
rights. See, e.g., Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983) (requiring stu-
dents of public university to fund campus newspaper held constitutional). For a
discussion of the circuit court opinions considering mandatory funding of uni-
versity organizations, see infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
6. 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989).
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he disagreed. 7
II. DISCUSSION
In Frame, the defendant was the owner of a cattle auction sales busi-
ness in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and raised cattle at his resi-
dence in Chester County, Pennsylvania. 8 Under the Act, Frame was
required to collect one dollar per head from the proceeds derived from
the sale of cattle at his auction barn and to pay the assessments on each
head of cattle he sold as a producer. 9 Since the effective date of the Act,
however, Frame had not collected or remitted the required assessments
nor filed the required reports.' 0
In November 1986, the United States brought an action to recover
Frame's unpaid dues. I Frame admitted that he had not paid the assess-
ments, but argued that the Act violated his first amendment right to re-
main silent and to refrain from associating. 12 The District Court,
7. Id. at 1129-37. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of the
first amendment issue, see infra notes 21-48 and accompanying text. This
casebrief will only address the court's disposition of the first amendment claim.
For a brief exposition of the other constitutional arguments raised and rejected
in Frame, see infra note 48.
8. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1124.
9. Id.
10. Id. Frame admitted that he had not collected the required assessments
since October 1, 1986, the effective date of the Act. Id. at 1124-25. Despite
reports that small cattle producers around the country resented the imposition
of the mandatory fee, Frame was the only small producer who refused to pay.
See Ditzen, Cattlemen's Beef: Feesfor Ad Campaign, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 26, 1988, at
A6, col. 4. Underlying the small cattle producer's complaint was the belief that
large, politically powerful cattle producers, had successfully persuaded Congress
to force small producers to contribute to the add campaigns. See id.; see also Brief
for Appellants at 6, United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989) (No.
88-1104) (asserting that despite "overwhelming opposition, the special interests
managed to get the 1985 Act passed.").
11. United States v. Frame, 658 F. Supp. 1476 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 885
F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
12. Id. at 1481-82. Specifically, Frame argued that first amendment protec-
tion extends to the right to remain silent and to refrain from associating and that
the Act violated these rights by forcing him to associate with and to support an
organization which espoused views he rejected. Id. at 1482. On appeal, Frame
explained his argument as follows:
The [Beef Promotion Board] is engaging in a nationwide media cam-
paign designed to increase the national consumption of beef, and beef
products. The appellants have no desire to participate in this program,
disagree with its message and methods, and want no part of any associ-
ation ... with this government created trade association.
Frame, 885 F.2d at 1129. For a discussion of the "negative first amendment
rights" of refraining from speech and associating, see infra notes 21-23 and ac-
companying text.
The Operating Committee was created by the Act for the purpose of devel-
oping plans of promotion and advertising. 7 U.S.C. § 2904(4)(B) (1988). For a
detailed discussion of the Act's statutory scheme, see infra notes 17-20 and ac-
companying text.
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however, concluded that the Act did not burden Frame's first amend-
ment rights because the Operating Committee's promotions were dis-
seminated by the government, and that no citizen had the right to refuse
to support any federal governmental program because that citizen dis-
agreed with the government's message.13
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the District Court's "govern-
ment speech" holding, but affirmed on other grounds. 14 The Third Cir-
cuit held that the Act satisfied the three-pronged test utilized to
determine the constitutionality of impingements on first amendment as-
sociational rights: (1) the impingement was justified by a compelling
state interest; (2) the Act was ideologically neutral and; (3) the Act in-
fringed on first amendment rights no more than necessary to accomplish
its purpose.' 5 Justice Sloviter, dissenting, argued that the government
had not asserted even a substantial interest, that the Act was not ideo-
logically neutral and that it did infringe on first amendment rights more
than was necessary to accomplish its purpose.' 6
The Frame court began its analysis by explaining the statutory
scheme. Pursuant to the Act, a Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Re-
search Board (Cattlemen's Board) and a Beef Promotion Operating
Committee (Operating Committee) were both created. 17 The Operat-
13. Frame, 685 F. Supp. at 1481-82. The District Court began by presuming
that the "speech ... is made by the government." Id. at 1482. The District
Court then concluded that while the first amendment protects an individual's
right to disagree with the government, it would be a "strange result" if an indi-
vidual could invoke the first amendment to refuse to contribute to the cost of
government. Id.
The Act established a Beef Promotion Operating Committee which was re-
sponsible for developing plans of promotion and advertising. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2904(4)(B) (1988). For a detailed discussion of the statutory scheme, see infra
notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
14. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1137. For a discussion of the applicability of the
government speech doctrine, see infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
15. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1130-37. The Supreme Court developed the three-
pronged test to determine the constitutionality of impingements on associa-
tional rights in Roberts v. United StatesJaycees. See 458 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). For a
discussion of Roberts, see infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
16. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1143-49 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Justice Sloviter's dissent, see infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
17. The Secretary's order creating the Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Re-
search Board is codified in 7 C.F.R. § 1260.141 (1989). The order creating the
Beef Promotion Operating Committee is contained in 7 C.F.R. § 1260.161
(1989). Members of the Cattlemen's Board are appointed by the Secretary of
Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. § 2904(1) (1988); 7 C.F.R. § 1260.141(b) (1989). The
Cattlemen's Board elects 10 of its members to sit on the Operating Committee
and 10 members are elected by a federation that includes as members Qualified
State beef councils. 7 U.S.C. § 2904(4)(A); 7 C.F.R. § 1260.161(a) (1989).
Qualified State beef councils are defined in 7 C.F.R. § 1260.115 (1989):
'Qualified State beef council' means a beef promotion entity that is au-
thorized by State statute or a beef promotion entity organized and op-
erating within a State that receives voluntary assessments or
contributions; conducts beef promotion, research and consumer and
1990] 765
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ing Committee is responsible for developing plans or projects of promo-
tion, advertising, research and consumer and industry information.' 8
All budgets, plans or projects of the Operating Committee approved by
the Cattlemen's Board become effective only upon final approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture.' 9 The Secretary is also authorized to remove
members of both the Cattlemen's Board and the Operating Committee
if the Secretary determines that the individual's continued service would
be detrimental to the purposes of the Act.20
Following its discussion of the Act's statutory scheme, the court
then addressed Frame's first amendment argument. The court began by
acknowledging that the first amendment protects a citizen from com-
pelled speech or association and that this protection is implicated when
individuals are compelled by the government to finance private
groups. 2 1 To support this proposition, the Third Circuit cited Abood v.
industry information programs and that is certified by the board pursu-
ant to this subpart as the beef promotion entity in such state.
7 C.F.R. § 1260.115 (1989).
Members of either entity serve without compensation. 7 U.S.C. § 2904(3)
(Cattlemen's Board); 7 U.S.C. § 2905 (Operating Committee).
18. 7 U.S.C. § 2904(4)(B) (1988). The Operating Committee is also au-
thorized to enter into contracts with established national, nonprofit, industry-
governed organizations to implement the Beef Promotion Act. Id. § 2906. The
Operating Committee's duties are set out in greater detail in the Secretary's or-
der. 7 C.F.R. § 1260.168 (1989).
The Cattlemen's Board is required to administer the order, make rules and
regulations to effectuate the terms of the order, elect members to serve on the
Operating Committee and to approve or disapprove budgets submitted by the
Committee. 7 U.S.C. § 2904(2). The Secretary's order, as required by the Act,
setting forth the powers and duties of the Board is contained in 7 C.F.R.
§§ 1260.149-.150 (1989).
19. 7 U.S.C. § 2904(4)(C) (1988). In addition, the Board is required to
submit to the Secretary an audit of its activities for each fiscal period. 7 C.F.R.
§ 1260.150(1) (1989). It must also maintain books and records for the Secre-
tary's inspection and audit. Id. § 1260.150(h). The Secretary must also approve
all contracts for the implementation of any plans. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2904(6)(B); 7
C.F.R. §§ 1260.150(f) & (g), 1260.168(e) & (f) (1989).
20. 7 C.F.R. § 1260.212 (1989).
21. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1130. First amendment protection from government
compelled speech was first recognized by the Supreme Court in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, the Court
held that the first amendment bars a state from forcing school children to salute
and pledge allegiance to the flag. Id. at 642. In the next compelled speech case,
Wooley v. Maynard, the Court held that a state could not compel citizens to dis-
lay an ideological slogan on the citizen's automobile license plates. 430 U.S.
705, 713 (1977). The Wooley court asserted that the "right to freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Id. at 714; see
also Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 525, 559 (1985)
("There is necessarily a . . . freedom not to speak publicly .... ").
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court found the right to refrain
from speaking implicated when employees are forced to finance a union which
espouses views which the employees reject. 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977). Spe-
cifically, the Court held that state laws authorizing unions and management to
766 [Vol. 35: p. 762
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Detroit Board of Education,2 2 where the Supreme Court held that state
mandated assessment of funds from employees to finance a union's
political and ideological activities, which were extraneous to the union's
collective bargaining duties, violated the dissenting employee's right to
refrain from associating. 23 The concurring opinion in Abood, however,
stated that the right to refrain from speaking or associating, commonly
referred to as "negative first amendment rights," is not implicated when
the government forces a citizen to support a governmental entity which
espouses views the citizen rejects.2 4 The district court had relied on this
distinction when it held that the promotions sponsored by the Cattle-
men's Board and Operating Committee were messages disseminated by
government which Frame could not refuse to support. 25
The Third Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion for two
reasons. First, the court concluded that the rationale underlying the
right to be free from compelled speech or association did not support
the district court's opinion. 26 The court held that where the govern-
enter into "agency shop" agreements, which require every employee to pay the
union a service charge equal in amount to union dues, impinge upon the em-
ployee's right to refrain from speaking. Id. The Court reasoned that "contribut-
ing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a political message is
protected by the First Amendment . . . [b]ecause '[m]aking a contribution ...
enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common
political goals.'" Id. at 234 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976)).
First amendment protection from government compelled association was also
recognized in Abood. Id. at 222. The Court recognized that forcing an employee
to finance a union interferes with an employee's freedom to associate. Id. The
right of freedom to refrain from associating was explicitly recognized in Roberts
v. United StatesJaycees, where the Court noted that "[f]reedom of association...
plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate." 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
22. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). For a discussion of Abood, see supra note 21.
23. Abood, 431 U.S. at 209. The first amendment rights of freedom not to
speak or associate are commonly referred to as "negative" first amendment
rights.
24. Id. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell indicated that
while compelled funding of private associations is constitutional only if sup-
ported by a compelling state interest, requiring support of government needs no
such justification. Id. (Powell, J., concurring) Justice Powell asserted that the
reason for permitting the government to compel payment of taxes and to spend
money on controversial projects without requiring a compelling state interest is
that government is representative of the people. Id. (Powell, J., concurring) A
private association, such as a union, according to Justice Powell, is fundamen-
tally different because it "represent[s] only ... one segment of the population,
with certain common interests." Id. (Powell,J., concurring) Justice Powell's pro-
posed distinction was adopted by the Frame court. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1131.
25. Frame, 658 F. Supp. at 1482. Although not citing Abood, the District
Court's opinion implicitly accepted the doctrine of "government speech." Id.
Under this doctrine, compelling citizens to support government, when those cit-
izens reject the messages disseminated by government, does not implicate the
citizen's first amendment rights. For a discussion of the district court's reason-
ing, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
26. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1132. Specifically, the Frame court noted that "the
underlying rationale of the right to be free from compelled speech or association
7671990]
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ment requires a "publicly identified group to contribute to a fund
earmarked for the dissemination of a particular message associated with
that group," the issue of government speech will not arise. 27 Second,
the court found that Justice Powell's justification in Abood for distin-
guishing compelled support of government from support of a private
association "does not fit comfortably" with the Beef Promotion Act.28
In Abood, Justice Powell stated that a union's expressive activities cannot
be considered government speech because unions represent only one
segment of the population with common interests. 29 Because the Oper-
ating Committee was also composed of only one segment of the popula-
tion, the majority and dissenting opinions in Frame both concluded that
it was analogous to a union, so that its expressive activities could not be
considered government speech.30
After rejecting the district court's government speech holding, the
Third Circuit considered whether the Act unduly impinged on Frame's
negative first amendment rights.3 1 The court determined that the Act
should be subject to the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Roberts v.
United StatesJaycees.3 2 The Roberts Court held that interference with asso-
leads us to conclude that the compelled expressive activities mandated by the
Beef Promotion Act are not properly characterized as 'government speech.' "
Id. The court failed to state, however, what that rationale was. For a discussion
of the rationale underlying negative first amendment rights, see infra notes 97-
100 and accompanying text.
27. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1132. The court argued that the government speech
doctrine applied only when a close coerced nexus existed between the com-
pelled funding and the expressive activities:
[T]he right to be free from compelled [association and speech] presup-
pose[s] a coerced nexus between the individual and the specific expres-
sive activity. When the government allocates money from the general
tax fund to controversial ... expressive activities, the nexus between
the message and the individual is attenuated. In contrast, where the
government requires a publicly identified group to contribute to a fund
earmarked for the dissemination of a particular message associated with
that group, the government has directly focused its coercive power for
expressive purposes.
Id. (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 1133.
29. Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring). For a further dis-
cussion of this distinction, see infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
30. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1133, 1145-46 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1133-34.
32. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Roberts, the Court upheld a state statute that, as
interpreted by state agencies and courts, required theJaycees, a private organi-
zation, to admit women as members. Id. at 628-29. The Court concluded that
the statute infringed on the right not to associate, but held that this encroach-
ment on first amendment rights was justified by the state's compelling interest in
eliminating discrimination. Id. at 623; see also Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l
v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (state statute requiring private all
male club to admit women constitutional). For a discussion of the potential con-
flict between the policy of eliminating discrimination and the right of associa-
tion, see Linder, Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82
768 [Vol. 35: p. 762
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ciational rights is constitutional only if the interference is (1) justified by
compelling state interests, (2) unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and
(3) not achievable through significantly less restrictive means. 33
Applying the first prong of this test, the Frame court, strongly influ-
enced by the Act's legislative history, found that the government's inter-
est in maintaining and expanding beef markets was sufficiently
compelling to uphold the Act. 34 The court accepted Congress's finding
that the continued bankruptcy of cattlemen would endanger both the
country's meat supply and the entire economy.3 5 The court was also
influenced by Congress's hope that maintenance of the beef industry
would ensure the preservation of the American cattleman's traditional
way of life. 3 6 Based on these economic and non-economic considera-
tions, the court held that the Act was justified by compelling state
interests. 37
The court next examined whether the Act was unrelated to the sup-
pression of ideas. The court concluded that the purpose of the Act was
ideologically neutral by comparing the Act's purpose with the purpose
of other compelled expressive activities held unconstitutional.38 For ex-
ample, in Wooley v. Maynard,39 the Supreme Court found unconstitu-
tional a New Hampshire statute requiring vehicles to bear licenses
embossed with the motto "Live Free or Die" when the avowed purpose
MicH. L. REV. 1878 (1984); Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81
Nw. U.L. REV. 68 (1986).
The Frame court recognized that the Beef Promotion Act implicated the
right to refrain from associating and the right to refrain from speaking. Frame,
885 F.2d at 1133. The court also characterized the compelled speech as "com-
mercial speech." Id. As the Frame court interpreted Supreme Court precedent,
impingements on associational rights must be justified by a compelling state in-
terest, while impingements on commercial speech rights must be justified by a
substantial state interest. Id. at 1133-34. Since the right to refrain from associ-
ating was implicated by the Act, the court applied the more stringent compelling
state interest test. Id.
33. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. For a discussion of Roberts, see supra note 32.
34. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1134-35 ("[T]he national interest in maintaining and
expanding beef markets proves . . . compelling.").
35. Id. at 1134 (citing H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1985),
reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1111).
36. Id. at 1135 (citing 121 CONG. REc. H31,436 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1975)
(remarks of Rep. Railsback). The court also suggested that the government's
interest in eliminating the problem of "free riders" justified the mandatory as-
sessment. Id. at 1135. The "free rider" problem arose because before the
mandatory fee, beef promotions were voluntarily financed, presumably to the
benefit of all cattle producers, so that those who did not contribute received a
benefit without sharing the costs. Id.
37. Id. The court also noted that the funding mechanism "plays an integral
role" in furthering the interests of the Act and that the Cattlemen's Board and
Operating Committee "prove similarly crucial to the scheme." Id.
38. Id. at 1137. The Frame court interpreted the second prong of the Rob-
erts test as requiring that the Act be ideologically neutral. Id. at 1134.
39. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). For a discussion of Wooley, see supra note 21.
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of the statute was to promote state pride.40 Similarly, in West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette,4 1 the Court struck down a state require-
ment that all school children pledge allegiance to the flag when the pur-
pose of the rule was to further national unity.4 2 The Third Circuit
concluded that the Act was ideologically neutral because its purpose,
contrary to the purpose of the requirements in Wooley and Barnette, was
to increase the sale of beef and not to prescribe an official orthodoxy.
43
Finally, in addressing the third element of the Roberts test, the court
held for two reasons that the Act impinged on first amendment rights no
more than was necessary to accomplish its purpose.4 4 First, the court
noted that the Act's interference with first amendment rights "appears
slight" compared with infringements upheld in prior Supreme Court
cases. 45 Second, the court found that the Act would not infringe on
Frame's political beliefs because the Act prohibited expenditures for the
purpose of influencing governmental action or policy. 46 For these rea-
sons, the court concluded that the Act did not impinge on first amend-
ment rights more than was necessary to accomplish its purpose.4 7 Thus,
40. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716. The Court concluded that the state's interest in
promoting state pride by disseminating an ideology cannot outweigh an individ-
ual's right to avoid becoming the courier for the state's message. Id. at 717.
41. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For a discussion of Barnette, see supra note 21.
42. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626-27 n.1. Specifically, the West Virginia State
Board of Education made several findings:
[That] national unity is the basis of national security; that the flag of our
Nation is the symbol of our National unity transcending all internal dif-
ferences, however large within the framework of the Constitution; that
the Flag is the symbol of the Nation's power; that emblem of freedom
in its truest, best sense; that it signifies government resting on the con-
sent of the governed, liberty regulated by law, protection of the weak
against the strong, security against the exercise of arbitrary power, and
absolute safety for free institutions against foreign aggression.
Id. at 627 n. 1. In invalidating the statute, the Court stated that "[ijf there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
Id. at 642.
43. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1135.
44. Id. at 1136-37.
45. Id. at 1136. The court noted that unlike unions, which under a state
authorized agency shop agreement are entitled to fees from all employees,
union or nonunion, the Board will not engage in activities that necessarily impli-
cate a broad range of ideological, moral, religious, economic, and political inter-
ests. Id. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases upholding state authorized
agency shops, see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
46. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1135. "The order shall prohibit any funds collected
by the Board under the order from being used in any manner for the purpose of
influencing governmental action or policy, with the exception of recommending
amendments to the order." Id. at 1136 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2904(10) (Supp. III
1985)).
47. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1137. The court also discounted Frame's argument
that applying the statute to him would significantly burden his first amendment
9
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because the Act satisfied the Roberts three prong test, the court rejected
Frame's first amendment arguments. 48
Justice Sloviter, although agreeing that the promotions were not
government speech, argued that the Act failed to satisfy each prong of
the Roberts test.4 9 Instead of applying a compelling interest test, how-
ever, Justice Sloviter argued that the Act could not be justified under the
less rigorous substantial interest test which is applied to regulations of
commercial speech.50 Justice Sloviter implied that the government has a
substantial interest in regulating commercial speech only if the regula-
tion is designed to protect consumers from fraud, illegal activity or
harmful health effects. 5' Because the Act would not so protect consum-
ers, Justice Sloviter concluded that it was not justified by a substantial
rights by characterizing his objections to the statute as being a dispute over
"mere" strategy. Id.
48. Id. at 1137. The court also rejected Frame's other constitutional argu-
ments. First, the court held that the Act was a valid exercise of Congressional
power under the Commerce Clause, explaining that the Congress had the au-
thority under the Commerce Clause to promote commerce and that promoting
commerce was the purpose of the Act. Id. at 1126-27. The court also held that
the Act did not unlawfully delegate legislative authority to the Secretary of Agri-
culture or to the Cattlemen's Board. Id. at 1129. Because the Act set forth with
unusual specificity the Secretary's duties, and because no legislative authority
was delegated to members of the beef industry, the court found no unlawful
delegation. Id. at 1128-29.
Frame's challenge under the fifth amendment fared no better. First, the
court held that the Act did not violate the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment that prohibits the federal government from discriminating be-
tween individuals or groups. Id. at 1138. Since the Act did not create a suspect
classification or impinge upon a fundamental constitutional right, the court ap-
plied, and found easily satisfied, a test that required that differences in treatment
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Id. at 1137. Fi-
nally, the court rejected the claim that the Act effected a taking of private prop-
erty for a private purpose because of Congress's finding that the maintenance of
beef markets is vital to the general economy of the nation. Id. at 1137-38.
49. Id. at 1144-49 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Justice Sloviter agreed with the
majority that the expressive activities of the Operating Committee did not con-
stitute government speech. Id. at 1145-46 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1146 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Justice Sloviter stated that because
the compelled expressions at issue were commercial, the test for regulations of
commercial speech was applicable. Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting). In Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Supreme Court held that
regulations of commercial speech must be justified by a substantial state interest.
447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980).
The majority agreed that the Central Hudson standard was applicable, but
recognized that because the Act also impinged on associational rights, it must be
justified by a compelling state interest. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1134 n.12.
51. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1147 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Although Justice
Sloviter noted that government has a substantial interest in protecting consum-
ers from fraud, illegal activity or harmful health effects, she failed to consider
whether any other reason, such as protecting the country's largest agricultural
industry, might justify regulations of commercial speech. Id. (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting).
1990]
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government interest. 52
Justice Sloviter also disagreed with the majority's characterization
of the Act as ideologically neutral. 53 While the dissent recognized that
the beef promotions were less ideological than the motto "Live Free or
Die," it concluded that the promotions were not neutral because the
advertisements promoting beef might offend vegetarians. 54 Finally, the
dissent argued that support for the promotions had grown and there
was no evidence that cattle producers would refuse to voluntarily con-
tribute to the fund given the chance.5 5 For these reasons, the dissent
concluded that the Act did impinge on first amendment rights more
than was necessary to accomplish its purpose. 56
III. ANALYSIS
This Casebrief submits that the court's analysis, though flawed,
came to the proper conclusion. First, the court failed to properly con-
sider the policy justifying the government speech doctrine and its rea-
sons for refusing to apply the doctrine were unpersuasive. Proceeding
on the assumption that the government speech doctrine did not apply,
however, the court correctly applied and found satisfied the Roberts test.
Finally, the court's conclusion was justified because the Act failed to in-
flict a cognizable constitutional injury.
The court's analysis of the government speech doctrine was flawed
because it failed to consider the justification underlying that doctrine.
In Abood, Justice Powell explained that citizens cannot withhold funds
from a government whose message they reject because the government
is representative of the people. 57 Underlying this justification of
government speech is the premise that in a representational political
system the people control government and thus may prevent govern-
52. Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
53, Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The advertisements that the dissent re-
ferred to stated that "the lowdown on beef is probably less than you think-
lower in calories, leaner on fat, lighter on cholesterol than you ever imagined,"
and "I [Cybil Sheperd] know some people don't eat hamburgers. But I'm not
sure I trust them." Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The dissent also pointed out
that the health effects of eating substantial quantities of beef is a matter of con-
troversy. Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1148 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The dissent attempted to distin-
guish Abood, where compelled mandatory assessments of union dues were up-
held, because the purpose of the compulsion was to promote peaceful labor
relations while "[t]he function performed by a self-promoting industry group is
hardly comparable." Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
57. Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n. 13 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he reason for
permitting the government to compel the payment of taxes and to spend money
on controversial projects is that the government is representative of the
people.").
772 [Vol. 35: p. 762
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ment dissemination of objectionable messages. 58 In other words, the
redress of the populace when government propagates unacceptable
messages is to change the government, not to refuse to support it. The
proper government speech analysis turns, therefore, on whether the ex-
pressions of an entity are subject to the government's, and thus the pop-
ulace's, control. 59 If the expressions are subject to government control,
the government speech doctrine should be applied.
This justification of government speech, furthermore, applies to all
spending, whether from a general or "earmarked" fund. For example, if
a state uses tolls collected from truckers to fund the erection of bill-
boards containing the message "support local truckers," the populace's
power to force the state to remove the billboards is not diminished by
the fact that only truckers contribute to the fund. The Third Circuit,
however, failed to consider how this rationale applies to the Beef Re-
search and Information Act.
Justice Powell's justification of the government speech doctrine dic-
tates that the promotions made under the Act be considered govern-
ment speech for two reasons. First, Congress has empowered the
Operating Committee to make these expressions; 60 accordingly, Con-
gress too may halt the Operating Committee's expression. The ultimate
power of determining whether the expressions at issue should be made
vests in Congress, and, therefore, in the people. Furthermore, Congress
58. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 58 U.S.L.W. 4661, 4664 (U.S. June
4, 1990) ("If every citizen were to have a right that no one paid by public funds
express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of public concern
would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as
we know it radically transformed."); DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists,
31 Cal. 2d 139, 150, 187 P.2d 769, 776 (1947) ("In a government based on
democratic principles ... the individual would raise but a faint cry of invasion of
his constitutional rights should he seek to avoid his obligation [to pay taxes]
because of a difference in personal views.").
59. The first amendment does not restrict the government's power to de-
termine when it should speak, and thus would not restrict the Secretary's power
to determine whether the Operating Committee's promotions should be dissem-
inated. See G. GuNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1276 (11th ed. 1985) ("[The]
view of the First Amendment as restricting the government only when it plays
the role of regulator and not when it itself communicates is an accurate general-
ization of current law.") (footnote omitted).
The issue currently being debated among commentators is whether the first
amendment restricts the government's expressive powers when the government
uses its power to distort or overwhelm the marketplace of ideas. For a discus-
sion of this issue, see M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27
UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Lim-
its of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV. 578 (1980).
60. See 7 U.S.C. § 2904(4)(B) (1988) ("The Committee shall develop plans
or projects of promotion and advertising .... "). In addition, both the Cattle-
men's Board and Operating Committee are entities created pursuant to a federal
statute. See 7 U.S.C. § 2904(1) (Cattlemen's Board); 7 U.S.C. § 2904(4)(A) (Op-
erating Committee).
1990] 773
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has required the Secretary of Agriculture to approve all plans, projects
and contracts of the Operating Committee. 6 1 Thus, the power to pre-
vent the dissemination of these messages also vests in the Executive. In
summary, the will of the people could work its effect on either Congress
or the Executive with the same result-the Operating Committee's pro-
motions would be discontinued. It is for this reason that the court erred
by rejecting the government speech doctrine. 62
The court not only failed to identify the policy underlying the gov-
ernment speech doctrine, it also argued unpersuasively that the Operat-
ing Committee's promotions were not government speech. First, the
court asserted that the government speech doctrine is inapplicable when
61. See 7 U.S.C. § 2904(4)(C) (1988); 7 U.S.C. § 2904(6)(A) & (B). Govern-
ment control under the Act is also manifest in the provisions requiring the Oper-
ating Committee and Cattlemen's Board to be staffed by persons appointed by
the Secretary and to be ultimately responsible to the Secretary. 7 U.S.C. § 2904;
7 C.F.R. § 1260.212 (1989).
62. It should be noted that the Court would most likely hold that the Oper-
ating Committee and the Cattlemen's Board were governmental entities for the
purpose of constitutional restraints. Under the "joint activity" theory, private
persons who participate in joint activity with governmental officials are deemed
governmental actors whose actions are subject to constitutional restraints. See
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1965) (private individuals who conspired
with local law enforcement officers to arrange murder of three civil rights work-
ers deemed governmental actors); see also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private restaurant leasing space in state building deemed
governmental actor when financial viability of building as home for an adminis-
trative agency depended on restaurant's success).
Under the joint activity theory, the Operating Committee would be consid-
ered a governmental entity and thus would be subject to constitutional re-
straints. For example, the Operating Committee would be barred from refusing
to hire minority owned advertising firms since this action would violate the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment which prohibits the government
from discriminating against groups. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In Frame, the government ap-
peared to adopt this theory by arguing that the Operating Committee was an
agent of the Secretary of Agriculture. Supplemental Brief For Appellee at 22,
United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-1104).
Whether the Cattlemen's Board and Operating Committee would be con-
sidered government for purposes of constitutional restraints, however, is not
dispositive of the characterization of those entities for purposes of government
speech. The determination of whether an entity is governmental in nature for
purposes of constitutional restraints usually depends on whether there is a suffi-
cient nexus between the entity and the government. See GUNTHER, supra note 59,
("[One approach in determining whether an actor is governmental] may be
called the 'nexus' approach: it seeks to identify sufficient points of contact be-
tween the private actor and the state to justify imposing constitutional restraints
.... That search.., permeates most of the cases .... "). In contrast, however,
under the proposed analysis, the determination of whether an entity's expres-
sions should be considered government speech depends on whether the govern-
ment has the unfettered power to determine if the expressions should be
disseminated. Nevertheless, under the proposed analysis, the Cattlemen's
Board and Operating Committee would be consistently classified as govern-
ment, whether for purposes of constitutional restraints or for determining the
applicability of the government speech doctrine.
[Vol. 35: p. 762
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there is a close coerced financial nexus between an identifiable group
and a message associated with that group.63 The toll booth analogy
given above, however, refutes this proposition. If the state uses tolls
collected from truckers to place messages supporting truckers on bill-
boards, the government is clearly the entity disseminating the advertise-
ments; the existence of a close coerced nexus between an identifiable
group and the message is irrelevant.
The court also argued that Justice Powell's explanation of the gov-
ernment speech doctrine "does not fit comfortably" with the Act be-
cause the Cattlemen's Board, like the union in Abood, represents one
segment of the population with certain common interests. 64 The union
in Abood, however, was not created by, or responsible to, the govern-
ment, nor were its messages subject to government control. 65 The gen-
eral populace's feelings towards the union's expressive activities are
irrelevant; the union can say what it wants without fear of government
interference regardless of the number of people it alienates.6 6 Thus,
that both the union and the Operating Committee are composed of indi-
viduals with certain common interests is also irrelevant.6 7
63. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1132. For a discussion of the court's government
speech reasoning, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
64. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1133.
65. Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.11 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. The union, of course, need only be sensitive of its member's reactions
to union sponsored messages.
67. In a recent case, Keller v. State Bar of California, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of government speech in a majority opinion. 58 U.S.L.W.
4661 (U.S. June 4, 1990). In Keller, California lawyers were required by state law
to pay dues to the State Bar which was created by California law to regulate the
state's legal profession. Id. The plaintiffs, California attorneys, objected to the
Bar's use of their dues to fund lobbying efforts and other activities on political
issues unrelated to the legal profession. Id. at 4662. The California Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiff's argument on the theory that the Bar Association
constituted a governmental entity which the attorneys could not refuse to sup-
port. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court began its analysis by noting that the State Bar was more analo-
gous to a union than to a governmental entity. Id. at 4663. The Court found it
significant that the Bar was funded from dues levied not by the legislature but by
the Board of Governors and that the State Bar does not admit lawyers to the
practice of law, disbar or suspend lawyers or establish ethical codes of conduct.
Id. at 4663. For these reasons the Court concluded that the State Bar was "cre-
ated [] not to participate in the general government of the State, but to provide
specialized professional advice to those with the ultimate responsibility of gov-
erning the legal profession." Id. at 4664. The Court also found that the reason
lawyers are required to fund the State Bar is similar to the reason employees are
required to fund unions, to eliminate the problem of "free riders." Id. at 4663.
These differences between the State Bar and traditional government agencies
lead the Court to reject the Bar's claim that "it is not subject to the same consti-
tutional rule with respect to the use of compulsory dues as are labor unions
.... " Id. at 4664.
Although the Supreme Court did not adopt the thesis of this casebrief in
Keller, the result is consistent with the proposed analysis. The expressions of the
State Bar, like the expressions of the union, are not subject to direct review by a
14
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Although the Frame court did not uphold the Act by finding that the
promotions at issue constituted government speech, the court correctly
held that the Act satisfied the Roberts test. First, the Act was justified by
compelling state interests. This proposition can be tested by comparing
the government's interest in cases in which compelled assessments have
been upheld to the government's interest in the Beef Information Act.
Cases in which compelled assessments have been at issue fall into three
categories: mandatory union dues, mandatory bar association dues and
mandatory student dues in state universities.
Mandatory union dues were first upheld by the Supreme Court in
Railway Employee's Department v. Hanson.68 In Hanson, nonunion employ-
ees challenged the Railway Labor Act which, for the purpose of further-
ing industrial peace, authorized unions and rail carriers to require that
all employees pay union dues, initiation fees and assessments. 69 The
Court held that Congress's authorization of union-shop contracts, which
required workers to financially support unions authorized to act as their
collective bargaining agents, did not violate the first amendment. 70
In a later union dues case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,7 1 the
governmental official for approval or disapproval. Thus, the government has no
power to control the dissemination of the State Bar's messages. It is precisely
this power which the government does have in the case of the Beef Promotion
Act. Because the promotions of the Beef Operating Committee are ultimately
subjected to government control, the government speech doctrine applies.
68. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
69. Id. at 235. The Act's authorization of "union-shop" agreements was
designed to further industrial peace by eliminating the problem of "free riders."
This term referred to employees who caused resentment in the workplace by
refusing to join the union while benefiting from the union's collective bargain-
ing activities. Id. at 231, 233; see also Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry, Airline & S.S.
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984) ("Congress' essential justification for authoriz-
ing the union shop was the desire to eliminate free riders-employees . . . on
whose behalf the union was obliged to perform its statutory functions, but who
refused to contribute to the cost thereof.").
For a discussion of the Frame court's attempt to demonstrate that the Act
also presented a "free rider" problem, see supra note 36.
70. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. The Court has recognized that by allowing the
union shop, it has "countenanced a significant impingement on first amendment
rights." Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455.
In International Association of Machinists v. Street, the Court reaffirmed Hanson,
but avoided addressing the question of whether the Constitution permits unions
to spend the dissenting employees' monies for political purposes by construing
the Railway Labor Act to forbid such spending. 367 U.S. 740 (1960). In Street,
railway employees brought an action to enjoin unions from expending monies
on political activity. Id. at 744. The Court, while realizing that the constitutional
questions presented were "of the utmost gravity," avoided addressing such by
construing the Railway Labor Act to forbid expenditures of dissenting employ-
ees' monies on political activities. Id. at 749-50, 768-79. The Supreme Court
did not address the constitutionality of forced payments for a union's political
activities until Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), 15
years later.
71. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). In Abood, plaintiffs challenged a state statute
which permitted local government employers and unions to require as a condi-
776 [Vol. 35: p. 762
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Court reaffirmed Hanson, but held that unions are prohibited by the first
amendment from using dissenting employees' funds for political activity
unrelated to collective bargaining. 72 The Abood Court reiterated that in-
terferences with an employee's first amendment rights are justified by
the "legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union
shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress."
73
The constitutionality of mandatory assessment of dues to a bar as-
sociation was first addressed by the Supreme Court in Lathrop v. Dono-
hue.7" Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, acknowledged that the
state's interest in promoting high standards in the legal profession and
in efficiency in the judicial system justified the assessment. 75 He de-
clined, however, to rule on whether the use of a dissenting attorney's
fees to further a political agenda violated that attorney's free speech
rights. 76 In the most recent forced funding case, Keller v. State Bar of
California,7 7 the court unanimously held that this use of a dissenting at-
tion of employment that every employee pay a fee, equal in amount to union
dues, to the union. Id. at 211. For a discussion of Abood, see supra note 22.
72. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35. The Abood Court, therefore, reaffirmed that
mandatory assessments on all employees to help pay for the union's collective
bargaining activities is constitutional so long as the dissenting employee's dues
are not used for political activity unrelated to the union's collective bargaining
activities. The Hanson Court's determination that the government's interest in
industrial peace justified some infringement of employees' first amendment as-
sociational rights was not questioned.
73. Id. at 222. For a discussion of the Court's approach to mandatory
union dues and a proposed alternative analysis, see Gaebler, Union Political Activ-
ity or Collective Bargaining? First Amendment Limitations on the Uses of Union Shop
Funds, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591 (1981).
74. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). In Lathrop, plaintiffs challenged an order of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court that forbade Wisconsin lawyers from practicing un-
less they paid a fee to the State Bar. Id. at 822.
75. Id. at 843 ("We think that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in order to
further the State's legitimate interests in raising the quality of professional serv-
ices, may constitutionally require the costs of improving the profession ...
should be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program,
the lawyers ....").
76. Id. at 843-45. Justice Brennan declined to address this issue because
the problem was not concretely presented for adjudication. Id. at 845. Justices
Harlan and Frankfurter, concurring, addressed the constitutional issue and
found unobjectionable the use of mandatory bar association dues for legislative
and law reform purposes. Id. at 848 (Harlan, J., concurring). Nevertheless, Jus-
tice Brennan left no doubt that mandatory dues could be assessed as long as the
monies were used to further the goals of promoting high standards and enhanc-
ing judicial efficiency. Id. at 843.
The goals of enhancing professional competence and efficiency in the judi-
cial system were to be furthered by using the mandatory fees to pay for post-
graduate education of lawyers, the activities of the Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law, the Legal Aid Committee and the distribution to the public of
pamphlets explaining legal issues. Id. at 839-41.
77. 55 U.S.L.W. 4661 (U.S. June 4, 1990). For a discussion of Keller, see
supra note 67.
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torney's fees did violate the first amendment. 78 Nevertheless, Lathrop
and Keller made clear that the states' interest in an integrated bar justi-
fies some resulting infringement on associational rights.7 9
Finally, although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the question,
most lower courts have held that the state's interest in promoting educa-
tion justifies mandatory student fees to finance entities, such as school
newspapers, that espouse views rejected by some students.8 0 For exam-
ple, in Kania v. Fordham,8 1 the Fourth Circuit rejected the student-plain-
tiffs' claim that use of their dues to finance a school newspaper violated
their first amendment rights.8 2 The Kania court affirmed the lower
court's finding that the state's interest in educating its citizens out-
weighed any harm to the plaintiffs and that the paper was a vital means
of advancing this interest.8 3
In summary, courts have held that the government's interest in in-
dustrial peace, high quality legal services and an educated citizenryjusti-
fies mandatory fees assessed against the individuals benefited by the
services, but have required in some cases that no monies be used for
78. Keller, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4664. Abood's proscription on the use of forced
payments to fund political activity, however, is not relevant to the constitutional-
ity of the Beef Research and Information Act because that Act specifically pro-
hibits the use of any mandatorily assessed funds for political purposes. See 7
U.S.C. § 2904(10) (1988) ("The order shall prohibit any funds collected ...
from being used in any manner for the purpose of influencing governmental
action or policy .... ").
79. The Keller Court, while forbidding the use of forced funding to finance
political activities, clearly accepted forced funding to finance activities related to
the Bar Association's proper function. See Keller, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4664 ("[T]he
compelled association . . . is justified by the State's interest in regulating the
legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. The State Bar may
therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the
mandatory dues .... ").
80. See Comment, Mandatory Student Fees: First Amendment Concerns and Uni-
versity Discretion, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 371 (1988) ("Several courts have heard
claims challenging the constitutionality of student fees. Almost unanimously
these courts have held fees permissible.").
The only case finding mandatory student fees unconstitutional was Galda v.
Rutgers. 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1985). The Galda
case, however, is clearly distinguishable from other cases that upheld mandatory
student fees because, in Galda, the fees were used to finance a political action
group independent of the University. Id. at 1065-67. This political action group
had a distinct ideological agenda aimed at issues not related to the University,
the educational benefits of which would not be available to dissenting students.
Id.; see Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ide-
ological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 48 (1984) ("To the extent that a
group directs its activities primarily to a general political audience outside the
campus, it is simply serving as a run-of-the-mill political party, not as a service
organization, and it ought not to be financed with forced fees.").
81. 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983).
82. Accord Veed v. Schwartzkpf, 353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb.) (state university
not prohibited from financing school newspaper using mandatory student fees),
aff'd mem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974).
83. Kania, 702 F.2d at 480.
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political purposes. There is simply no qualitative difference between the
government's interest in protecting the country's largest agricultural in-
dustry84 and any of the interests previously used to justify mandatory
fees. In addition, the Act embodies a principle inherent in the previ-
ously upheld funding schemes-that persons benefiting from a service
should contribute to the costs of providing that service. By finding that
the maintenance of beef markets is vital to the general economy of the
nation and that American citizens should continue to have an adequate
domestically produced food supply, Congress has asserted governmen-
tal interests which must, in light of the previously described interests, be
labelled compelling.8 5
The Frame court also correctly held that the Act was ideologically
neutral, the second element of the Roberts test. 86 In making this deter-
mination, the Frame court, as suggested by Supreme Court precedent,
examined the purpose underlying the Act.8 7 In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,8 8 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute that, as interpreted by
state agencies and courts, required a private organization, the Jaycees,
to admit women as members. 8 9 The Roberts Court held that because the
purpose of the state statute, eliminating discrimination, was unrelated to
the suppression of expression, the Minnesota Act was constitutional. 90
Furthermore, in the compelled speech cases the purpose of the state
statutes, whether requiring a child to pledge allegiance or a driver to
display a state motto, was clearly to prescribe an official orthodoxy. 9'
The Frame court correctly concluded, therefore, that the Beef Research
and Information Act was ideologically neutral because its purpose was
to increase the sale of beef, not to suppress expression or prescribe
orthodoxy.
Finally, the court also correctly held that the government's goals
84. See H.R. REP. No. 452, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1975) ("Beef cattle is
the largest sector of American agriculture.").
85. In addition, the Court has held that the government has a substantial
interest in energy conservation. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980). The purposes of energy conservation and
the Act are analogous-both strive to insure that American consumers continue
to have access to products essential to life. For this reason, Judge Sloviter's
opinion that the Act is not justified by even a substantial state interest is suspect.
86. Frame, 884 F.2d at 1135. For a discussion of the court's demonstration
that the Act was ideologically neutral, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying
text.
87. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1135.
88. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). For a discussion of Roberts, see supra notes 32-33
and accompanying text.
89. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29.
90. Id. at 624.
91. In the compelled speech cases, the Court held that a state could not
force a child to pledge allegiance or a citizen to display a state motto on a license
plate. See Wooley v. Manard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For a discussion of the compelled speech cases,
see supra note 21.
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could not be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of as-
sociational freedoms. 92 Recent Supreme Court cases indicate that the
requirement of narrow tailoring should only be used to invalidate regu-
lations in the most egregious circumstances. For example, in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism,93 the Supreme Court, in upholding a city regulation
that required use of city amplification during performances in a city
park, noted "the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as
the ... regulation promotes a ... government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' -94 By comparison the
government's interest in ensuring that adequate funds be available to
finance beef promotions would be achieved less effectively absent the
mandatory assessment. In other words, making the viability of beef pro-
motions contingent on voluntary contributions is clearly a less effective
way of insuring adequate financing than mandatory assessments. 95 For
this reason, the Third Circuit correctly held that there were no signifi-
cantly less restrictive means to accomplish the Act's goals. 9 6
92. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1135-37. For a discussion of the court's determina-
tion that government's goals could not be achieved through significantly less
restrictive means, see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
93. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989). In Ward, a rock group challenged a New York
City regulation which required the use of city-provided sound systems and tech-
nicians for concerts in Central Park. Id. at 2753. The Court, refusing to apply a
least -restrictive means analysis, held that "so long as the means chosen are not
substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," the
regulation would not be held invalid. Id. at 2758. After applying this standard,
the Court found the regulation constitutional. Id. at 2760.
94. Id. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985)). The Ward Court also noted that "[s]o long as the means chosen are not
substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest.., the
regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the govern-
ment's interest could be adequately served by some less ... restrictive alterna-
tive." Id. Another recent case illustrating the Court's unwillingness to use a
narrow means analysis to invalidate a regulation is State University of New York v.
Fox. 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033 (1989). The Fox Court, in upholding a regulation
forbidding "Tupperware parties" in dormitories, noted that restrictions
designed to prevent deceptive advertising "must be. . . 'no more extensive than
reasonably necessary to further substantial interests.' " Id. (quoting In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191, 03 (1982)).
95. This proposition is supported by the failure of cattle producers to ap-
prove the beef promotion effort in referendums taken pursuant to the 1976 Act
and to the 1978 Amendment. In 1976, only 56.4% of voting cattle producers
supported an implementation of the Secretary's Beef Promotion Order, while in
the 1978 Act, only 34.5% of the producers voted favorably. GLASER, supra note
2, at 74-75. While it is true that producers approved the 1985 Act by 78.9%,
these votes, taken together, indicate that support for mandatory assessments was
far from overwhelming. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1148 n.3. Therefore, it is logical
to conclude that the government's interest would be achieved less effectively
absent the mandatory assessment.
96. Although the court's conclusion was sound, its reasons why there were
no significantly less restrictive means were not convincing. First, the court ar-
gued that this test was satisfied because the Act did not infringe on first amend-
ment rights to the degree countenanced in the union shop cases. Frame, 885
780 [Vol. 35: p. 762
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Finally, the court's deference towards the Act was justified by the
insignificant constitutional injury which Frame incurred and by the need
to allow Congressional experimentation given the budget deficits. The
seriousness of Frame's constitutional injury can be assessed by identify-
ing the policies underlying negative first amendment rights and by de-
termining whether these policies are implicated by the Act. Prominent
commentators have recognized that negative first amendment rights do
not further the purpose traditionally ascribed to the first amendment-
insuring a free and open marketplace of ideas. 97 Instead, forbidding the
government from compelling speech or association protects an individ-
ual's interest in personal integrity or "selfhood." 9 8 It is simply not con-
ceivable that Frame's interests in personal integrity, freedom of
conscience, spirit or intellect were harmed by requiring him to help fi-
nance promotions of a product which he himself produces.9 9 There-
fore, the policies underlying negative first amendment rights were not
implicated by the mandatory assessments imposed on Frame.' 0 0 For
F.2d at 1136. What was countenanced in other cases, however, is clearly irrele-
vant to whether there were less restrictive means available to accomplish the
same goal in this case. Second, the court found it significant that the Act forbid
expenditures for political purposes. Id. Again, however, the court failed to ex-
plain how this supported the proposition that there were no less restrictive
means to accomplish the Act's purpose. Finally, the court interpreted Frame's
objections to the promotions as being a dispute over strategy and not content.
Id. at 1137. The issue of how Frame's objections should be construed, however,
is irrelevant to the availability of less restrictive means.
97. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-5 (2d ed. 1988) (as-
serting that principle underlying Wooley and Barnette is that first amendment pro-
tects individuals from "governmental shaping of the mind"); Gaebler, First
Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23.
B.C.L. REV. 995, 1004 (1982) ("Freedom of expression is not merely an instru-
mentality to foster intelligent self-government or the advancement of
knowledge.").
98. See TRIBE, supra note 97, § 15-5, at 1315 ("The constitution has enu-
merated specific categories of thought and conscience for special treatment:
religion and speech. Courts have . . .properly generalized from these protec-
tions . . . to define a 'sphere of intellect and spirit' constitutionally secure from
the.., manipulations of government!") (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)); Gaebler, supra note 97, at 1004
("[A]though compelling one to recite the pledge of allegiance may not interfere
with the 'free marketplace of ideas,' it does infringe upon what may be called the
individual's interest in selfhood.").
99. The Frame court, by interpreting Frame's disagreement with the beef
promotions as being one over mere strategy, intimated that it could not fathom
how the Act significantly infringed on his negative first amendment rights.
Frame, 885 F.2d at 1137.
100. Indeed some commentators question whether the policies underlying
negative first amendment rights are ever implicated when an individual is forced
to finance an entity that provides services beneficial to that individual. For ex-
ample, one commentator has argued:
It is within the prerogative of government to assign certain important
functions to private sector service institutions and to allocate the costs
of services to all those who benefit in some sense from the performance
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this reason, the Third Circuit was justified in finding the Beef Promotion
and Research Act constitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit incorrectly held that the Operating Committee's
promotions did not constitute government speech. The Third Circuit
erred by failing to recognize the significance of the government having
the ultimate power of determining whether any messages should be dis-
seminated. The Third Circuit, however, correctly upheld the Act by
finding that it was supported by compelling government interests, unre-
lated to the suppression of ideas that could not be achieved through
significantly less restrictive means. Finally, the Third Circuit was justi-
fied in recognizing that an Act which requires a beef producer to sup-
port promotions of beef products fails to inflict a cognizable
constitutional injury.
Paul Snitzer
of the function.... The fact that some forced payors have ideological
objections to the institution which benefits... does not entail a signifi-
cant impingement of first amendment interests. Payors are free to
speak and associate as they please, and they are not compelled to iden-
tify with or embrace the ideological causes chosen by the service institu-
tion in pursuing the mutual service aim.
Cantor, supra note 80, at 51; see also Shiffrin, supra note 59, at 590 ("The link
between compelled contributions and freedom of belief or expression . . . is
tenuous. And the invalidation of compelled contributions is surely a long step
from Barnette, where the state sought to compel individuals publicly to profess
beliefs they did not share.").
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